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MILITARY LAw REVIEW
FROM ROME TO THE MILITARY JUSTICE ACTS OF 2016
AND BEYOND: CONTINUING CIVILIANIZATION OF THE
MILITARY CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM
FREDRIC I. LEDERER*
I. Introduction
The recent, but unenacted, proposed Military Justice Act of 2016,'
the very different and less ambitious, but enacted, Military Justice Act of
2016,2 and congressional actions and proposals to sharply modify the
military criminal legal system to combat sexual assault and harassment3
provide both opportunity and necessity to reevaluate the fundamental
need for and nature of the military criminal legal system. With the
exception of the 1962 amendment to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice to enhance the commander's punishment authority,' the
modem history of military criminal law largely is defined by its
increasing civilianization. My thesis is that we are close to the point at
which that process will no longer meet the disciplinary needs of the
modem armed forces, if, indeed, it does today. Further, the policy
justifications traditionally used to defend a military criminal legal system
that is separate and distinct from civilian law increasingly appear less
* Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Center for Legal and Court Technology,
William & Mary Law School; Colonel, JAGC (retired). A former trial counsel, defense
counsel, military judge and co-author of the Military Rules of Evidence. From 1996-1999
via appointment by the Secretary of Defense, Professor Lederer served as one of two
public members of the Code Commiittee, the Congressionally created military criminal
law oversight body composed of the Judge Advocates General and the judges of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. This article is based on the 10th
Annual Major General George S. Prugh Lecture given on May 4, 2016 at The Judge
Advocate General's Center and School by Fredric Lederer. The opinions expressed in
this article are those of the author only. Professor Lederer thanks William & Mary Law
School students Eric Taber and Micheala Leiberman for their research assistance.
1 MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP, REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP,
PART I: UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS (December 22, 2015) [hereinafter REVIEW GROUP
REPORT], http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/inmges/report-partl.pdf, (last visited May 22,
2017).
2 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 §5001 et seq (December 23,
2016).
3 See, e.g., Major Elizabeth Murphy, The Military Justice Divide: Why Only Crimes and
Lawyers Belong in the Court-Martial Process, 220 MIL. L. REV. 129,132-33 (2014).
4 See text at note 53 infra.
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compelling than in the past.5 Congress, which has enhanced justice in
the armed forces, should act to ensure that the traditional military need
to ensure discipline is satisfied. This article proposes a possible
solution that would ensure both justice and discipline for members of
the armed forces. For purposes of simplicity, I will largely deal with
these matters from an Army perspective.6
Although I will discuss the nature of the military legal system in
detail later, it may suffice at present to note that the current system is
commander driven, meaning that at least legally commanders 7 are
responsible for making nearly all important case-related disposition
decisions; that military personnel serve as court-members (jurors); and
that implementing lawyers are military officers. Only at the appellate
stage when the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and the Supreme
Court may be involved do we depart from the truly military system. As
will be evident below, "civilianization" has often meant fostering
procedural due process, largely a highly commendable goal and result.
However, if taken too far, it may, and likely has already, harmed the
disciplinary goals of the military criminal justice system. At its most
extreme, the alternative to a military criminal legal system, full
"civilianization," would mean civilian jurisdiction resolution and
adjudication of offenses committed by military personnel, a system that
would imperil seriously both the disciplinary and justice needs of the
armed forces.
The initial question must be what are the traditional needs and
goals for a separate military criminal legal system. Then after an
historical analysis of how military law has evolved over the centuries
the issue becomes how well the current system serves those needs and
goals. Finally, in light of that appraisal the fundamental question must
be
' Indeed, that could clearly be the case if the entirely of the proposed Military Justice Act
of 2016 were to be enacted, which at the time of this writing in summer, 2016, seems to
be unlikely.
6 The origins of criminal law in the Army (and the Air Force which was created from the
Army in 194) are very different from those of the Navy and Coast Guard. See, e.g, JAMES
E. VALLE, ROCKS & SHOALS, ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE OLD NAVY 1800-1861 (1980);
NAVAL JUSTICE, NAVPERS 16199 (October 1945). However, I believe that
contemporary perspectives will be similar in all of the armed forces.
Service secretaries, the Secretary of Defense, and the President may all be involved in
law making. Each may prescribe regulatory requirements which are legally binding
absent contradiction by the Constitution or Congressional statute. E.g., U.S. CONST. art.
II § 2.
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whether a separate military criminal legal system can still be justified,
and what steps need to be taken to protect military discipline and justice
regardless of who runs that system.
II. Setting the Stage - Systemic Needs and Goals
The armed forces have long been considered a distinct and separate
society:
As the Supreme Court has stated, the military remains a
specialized society separate from civilian society ...
[because] it is the primary business of armies and navies
to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise." This separateness of purpose and mission has
shaped the values and traditions that are embodied in the
UCMJ, . .. 8
On a practical level, this requires that our military
criminal legal system take into account:
The worldwide deployment of military personnel;
The need for instant mobility of personnel;
The need for speedy trial to avoid loss of witnesses
due to combat effects and needs;
The peculiar nature of military life, with the attendant
stress of combat or preparation for combat;
8 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 17 (2015) (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 743 (1974)) (Report note, "internal quotation and citation omitted," omitted). As the
Supreme Court also observed:
[The Uniform Code of Military Justice] cannot be equated to a civilian criminal
code. It, and the various versions of the Articles of War which have preceded
it, regulate aspects of the conduct of members of the military which in the
civilian sphere are left unregulated.
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 749 (1974).
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The need for disciplined personnel.9
If these needs and goals are accurate, any legal system that fails them fails
the armed forces.
A. Discipline and Justice
There is near unanimous agreement that the fundamental purpose of
a military legal system is discipline. Although there are any number of
definitions, we might initially define "discipline" as compliance with
military orders.'0 If troops do not do what they're told when and in the
manner instructed, the mission likely fails." If they exceed instructions
or violate given constraints, the mission may fail. Even if successful,
departing from orders may create unacceptable negative consequences,
as in killing non-combatants and vastly complicating the applicable
political situation. Such a definition then includes compliance with
positive instructions, e.g,. "take that hill," and negative ones, such as
"Don't rape, plunder, pillage, or mutiny." Under the traditional view of
discipline, to be safe a soldier should do no more and no less than
instructed. Anything else puts the solider at risk. Article 134 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, an offense that dates back to pre-
Revolution British military law, thus criminalizes conduct that is
"prejudicial to good order and discipline." Accordingly, even if given
conduct has not previously been criminalized a service member is at risk
if he or she does something out of the ordinary.1 2 Although this can be
justified by the need to deter unexpected misconduct with serious adverse
9 FRANCIS A. GLLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, I COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE 1-4
(4th ed. 2015) (notes omitted).
0 "[Discipline] means an attitude of respect for authority developed by precept and by
training. Discipline-a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no
matter how unpleasant the task to be performed-is not characteristic of a civilian
community. THE COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, GOOD
ORDER AND DISCIPLINE IN THE ARMY, REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBER M. BRUCKER,
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 11 (Jan 18, 1960), quoted in REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE STUDY GROUP ON THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS 1, 34-35
(1989).
" More broadly, mission accomplishment depends on a background of training
and lifestyle that results in an effective military force. See, e.g. Madeline Morris, By
Force ofArms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 Duke L.J. 651, 691-98 (1996).
12 See, e.g. United States v. Sadinsky, 34 C.M.R. 343 (C.M.A. 1964) (involving a
case where, after having made a large bet with shipmates as to whether he would do it,
the accused did a backflip off an aircraft carrier in heavy seas at twilight requiring a
destroyer to leave the escort screen and a small boat to be launched from the destroyer
placing men
at risk).
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military consequences, it also strongly communicates the message
"Don't take initiative because if things go wrong punishment may
result." Given such a constrained definition of discipline, a
commander's primary objective when determining what to do with
an alleged offense by a subordinate may be to send a "message" to
the rest of the troops to encourage or deter them generally. And,
indeed as we will discuss with relation to Rome, historically
disciplinary punishment can be heavy-handed with little concern for
the equities as they affect a given charged offender. As Fran Gilligan
and I have reported:
In 1946, a War Department Committee commented:
A high military commander pressed by the awful
responsibilities of his position and the need for speedy
action has no sympathy with legal obstructions and
delays, and is prone to regard the courts-martial primarily
as instruments for enforcing discipline by instilling fear
and inflicting punishment... .13
Or, as Professor Wigmore put it in 1918, "The prime object of
military organization is Victory, not Justice."' 4
In short, a pure discipline-based system may care little or not at all
for "justice" for the individual offender. Eisenhower observed that
It [the armed services] was never set up to [e]ensure
justice. It is set up as your servant ... to do a particular
job ... and that function ... demands within the Army
somewhat, almost of a violation of the very concepts upon
which our government is established.... "
"Justice" customarily means fairness. At the very least no one should
be punished unless he or she did something wrong, and, ordinarily, the
13 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 9, at 1-7 (quoting REPORT OF WAR DEPARTMENT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE 5 (13 December 1946)).
14 THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS, 1775-
1975, 131 (1975).
15 Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization ofMilitary Law, 22 ME. L. REV. 3, 35 (1970)
(quoting November 17, 1948 remarks quoted in Letter from New York State Bar
Association to Committee on Military Justice (January 29, 1949) at 4 in VI Papers of
Professor Edmund Morgan on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, on file in Treasure
Room, Harvard Law School).
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punishment should be compatible with at least the degree of harm
caused.1
A justice-based system seeks accurate determination of
individual responsibility and proportional punishment. It is
based upon fairness, and to be functional, must be so perceived
by the personnel operating under it. It encourages individual
responsibility and institutional loyalty, for the crux of such a
system is individual accountability. One can only be punished
for what one has done wrong. Other goals are institutionally
subordinated to accuracy and fairness. Such a system inherently
assumes that people fight for reasons other than fear. The
shortcomings of such a system are clear: accuracy requires a
significant procedural process that is usually slow and expensive,
at least by comparison to summary procedure. Further,
depending upon the burden of proof used, a justice-based system
will yield acquittals of guilty persons, thus potentially calling the
system into disrepute and encouraging violations. 17
As Senator Nunn observed in 2002, however:
Morale and discipline of the armed forces are at the heart
of military effectiveness. Military Law is a vital element
in maintaining a high state of morale and discipline.
Members of the armed forces must have a clear
understanding of the standards of conduct to which they
must conform, and they must also have confidence that
the system of justice will operate in a fair and just
manner.18
The argument that "discipline" does not require justice is short
sighted. It erroneously presumes that personnel will endure indefinitely
the unjust punishment of others and comply fully with orders themselves
despite the risk of personal unfair punishment. Further, our prior
definition of discipline is flawed from a modem perspective. I would
argue that a more useful, modern definition would be that "discipline" is
16 This is not to suggest that other factors aren't at least equally important. I
am attempting to posit the most basic criminal justice considerations as many would
accept.
17 GLLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 9, at 1-7 (note 21 omitted).
18 Sam Nunn, The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
in Military Cases, in EUGENE FIDELL & DWIGHT H. SULLIVAN, EVOLVING MILITARY
JUSTICE 3, (2002) (emphasis added).
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the prompt obedience to orders and a willingness to use personal
initiative in an appropriate fashion in pursuit of mission. This is surely a
more nuanced and modem view than the traditional one that wanted only
simple obedience, and the difference is meaningful. In the modem world
where we prize and require initiative, we need to ensure that the solder
has the right and ability to be judged on the basis of what he or she did
and why. Even Article 134, punishing among other matters, conduct
"prejudicial to good order and discipline," theoretically only comes into
play when a service member's well-intentioned actions fail to achieve
their positive military-acceptable goal.
In short, although the relationship between "discipline" and justice"
remains an important conversation,19 viable fairness likely is essential to
maintain a modem form of American discipline. Accordingly, the
modem United States military legal system considers justice to be at least
as essential as discipline. The 2015 Report of the Military Justice Review
Group opined that:
The current structure and practice of the UCMJ embodies
a single overarching principle based on more than 225
years of experience: a system of military law can only
achieve and maintain a highly disciplined force if it is fair
and just, and is recognized as such both by members of
the armed forces and by the American public. "Once a
case is before a court-martial, it should be realized by all
concerned that the sole concern is to accomplish justice
under the law. . . . It is not proper to say that a military
court-martial has a dual function as an instrument of
discipline and as an instrument of justice. It is an
instrument of justice and in fulfilling this function it will
promote discipline." 20
Justice also requires that decision makers understand the unique
nature of military life, including the special stresses and consequences of
service, especially combat service.
" See, e.g., David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice System Conundrum: Justice or
Discipline, 215 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2013).
20 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (2015) (quoting at note 13, AD Hoc
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HON.
WILLIAM R. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 11 (Jan. 18, 1960)),
http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/reportpartl.pdf.
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Ultimately, however, it is not only the reality of justice which is
important but also the perception of justice, especially for the armed
services members who are subject to military law. And, as Hamlet
despairs in his soliloquy, "There's the rub," for it seems clear that our
perception of justice is based on civilian law and procedure. Certainly
the historical evolution of modem American military criminal law
supports that conclusion and, if that is correct, the resulting legal system,
mirroring the civilian system, may fail to successfully meet the armed
forces' systemic needs. If that proves to be the case, Congress will need
to consider how best to restructure the Uniform Code of Military Justice
to ensure that it complies with the disciplinary needs of the armed forces
as well as justice.
Before proceeding further it may be useful to note what I am not
addressing. In Herbert Packer's 1964 article, Two Models ofthe Criminal
Process,2 1 which I and others use to explain differing policy
understandings of the purpose of criminal law, he postulated two
differing models of the criminal justice system, the crime control model
and the due process model. Although the models are highly useful, and
can be applied to military criminal law, 22 my ultimate concern is with the
relationship between discipline and justice. Although there arguably is a
strong relationship between discipline and crime control, the fact that
discipline must at least be seen to be fair, makes the comparison
questionable.
II. The Evolution of American Military Criminal Law
It seems clear that the earliest form of military criminal law was the
commander's personal authority and responsibility to determine whether
perceived misconduct had taken place and to punish it if so. 23  Such
discretionary power was not tempered by any form of courts-martial and
was subject only to the power of more senior commanders or mutiny.
Rome provides a useful example.
21 Herbert Packer, Two Models ofthe Criminal Process, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1-68 (1964).
22 See David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice System Conundrum: Justice or Discipline,
215 MIL. L. REv. 1 (2013).
23 E.g. Robert O. Rollman, Of Crimes, Courts-Martial and Punishment-A Short History
of Military Justice, 11 A. F. REV 212 (1969) ("Among the early Germans, in the absence
of written law, justice was administered summarily by the chief commander through
priests."
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Roman resolution of misconduct was command-based. Although
scholarship has focused on the legions' use of extreme punishments such
as decimation 24 for purposes of general deterrence, procedure appears to
largely have been simply the commander's discretionary, and
often arbitrary, decision-although there seems to have been some
evidence of councils of tribunes in some cases. 25  Roman practice
incorporated the assumptions that speedy and certain punishment
provided general and specific deterrence. Further it embodied the view
that it was essential for the troops to be aware of at least the
realistic risk of disciplinary punishment. Harsh punishments,
including decimation, met those needs.
In his seminal work, Military Law and Precedents, Colonel Winthrop
declared that "of the written military laws of Europe the first authentic
instance appears to have been those embraced in the Salic Code,
originally made by the chiefs of the Salians at the beginning of the fifth
century .... "26 The famed 1621 code of King Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden included procedures, some of which required deliberative
bodies. Article 19 declared that whoever
behaves himself not obediently until our great Generall
[sic], or our Ambassador coming in our absence, . . . shall
be brought to his answer, before a Counsell of Warre
where being found guilty ... he shall stand to the order of
the Court, to lay what punishment upon him they shall
thinke [sic] convenient. . ."
Article 138 established a high court and a lower court, and Article
139 declared that "Every regiment has a lower Court" with a minimum
of 13 officers with the Colonel as president. Appeals to a higher court
were permitted by Article 151, and article 155 required all lower court
sentences to be approved by the General. Notably, Article 161 required
sentences to be read to all the men.27
24 Execution of every tenth man, often by fellow legionnaires.
25 C.E. BRAND, ROMAN MILITARY LAW 77 (1968).
26 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 17 (2d ed. 1920
Reprint). See also Robert O. Rollman, OfCrimes, Courts-Martial and Punishment--A
Short History ofMilitary Justice, 11 A.F. L. REv 212 (1969).
27 WINTHROP, supra note 26, at 1418.
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European and early American (if not later American as well) military
justice was to remain a rather summary thing. There was usually little
ceremony attendant upon the event of trial or hearing. Concern for the
rights of the individual were of little or no moment. And punishment
followed the judgment in rapid "one-two" order. In most instances the
"convening authority," i.e., the commander, "presided" with the sentence
being executed without confirmation and/or review by any superior
authority. 28
That discipline was not necessarily the only goal in the time period is
illustrated by the following quote, which I use in my military law books:
Justice ought to bear rule everywhere, and especially in
armies; it is the only means to settle order there, and there
it ought to be executed with as much exactness as in the
best governed cities of the kingdom, if it be intended that
the soldiers should be kept in their duty and obedience.29
There were no peacetime British courts-martial until 1689; instead,
serious offenses were tried by the civilian courts. With creation of a
standing army in 1689, Parliament enacted the first (annual) Mutiny Act
which both established parliamentary control and provided military
punishments extending to life or limb) in peacetime, working in tandem
with the pre-existing British Articles of War.30 Those Articles of War,
which included courts-martial, largely were adopted by the Continental
Congress on June 30, 1775, although a number came from the
intermediate Massachusetts Articles of War dating from a year earlier.3 1
Then General Washington found them seriously deficient as he
concluded that the new American Articles of War lacked sufficient
summary discipline powers.
What Congress did not see fit to provide by statute,
however, General Washington and other commanders of
the Revolutionary Army provided for themselves. By
General Orders dated September 19, 1776, Washington
28 Robert 0. Rollman, Of Crimes, Courts-Martial and Punishment--A Short History of
Military Justice, 11 A. F. REv 212, 214 (1969).
29 LOUIS DE GAYA, THE ART OF WAR (1678).
30 See generally WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 18-20 (2d ed.
1920 Reprint); G.A. Steppler, British Military Law, Discipline, and the Conduct of
Regimental Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century, 102 ENG. HIST. REv. 859
(1987).
31 WINTHROP, supra note 26, at 21-22.
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directed that: [All 1 . .. officers are charged . . . to seize
every soldier carrying Plunder ... [and the] Plunderer [is
to] be immediately carried to the . . . Brigadier or
commanding officer of a regiment, who is instantly to
have the offender whipped on the spot." Apparently
because he was experiencing difficulty in disciplining the
Army (and possibly having some doubt as to the authority
by which he was ordering summary punishment),
Washington sent a letter to the President of Congress on
September 22, 1776, wherein he said: Some severe and
exemplary Punishment to be inflicted in a summary Way
must be immediately administered, or the Army will be
totally ruined. I must beg the immediate Attention of
Congress to this Matter as of the utmost Importance to our
Existence as an Army." Two days later, in another letter
to Congress, Washington renewed his complaint
concerning lack of adequate laws to punish offenders and
notified Congress that he had ordered instant corporal
punishment for disobedience of orders."32
Unlike the Navy, Army commanders lacked significant recognized
summary punishment powers until Article 15 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice was expanded in 1962.
The Articles of War were amended, sometimes extensively,
particularly in 1786, 1806, and 1874.33 There were few changes in basic
military procedure in the 19th Century despite the Civil War. As Colonel
Harold Miller noted:
The increase in the size of the Army during the Civil War
brought with it a corresponding increase in disciplinary
problems. Since statutory authority to summarily punish
minor offenses was still not available, Washington's
device of supplying the needed authority by issuing
general orders was put to work again.
[Some of the punishments administered during the Civil
War were, to say the least, rather unusual. One
punishment that must have been particularly effective was
32 Harold Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 MIL. L. REV. 37, 41 (1965).
33 WINTHROP, supra note 26, at 22-24.
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that of staking an offender out on the ground and pouring
molasses on his hands, feet, and face. Whipping,
confinement in the guard house, carrying a ball and chain,
and tieing [sic] up by the thumbs were other punishments
awarded to offenders without benefit of a trial.34
Rapid summary punishment may assist effective discipline, at least
from the Roman perspective, but it may be neither fair nor perceived as
fair. Ideally, the determination of misconduct must be accurate and
perceived to so, and any punishment adjudged and implemented must be
fair and perceived as fair. From a pragmatic perspective, discipline
requires that resolution of alleged misconduct be perceived as fair.
However distressing it may be, from a disciplinary perspective it is likely
that personnel will accept procedures and results that they feel is "fair"
and just even if from an objective perspective they are not. Of course,
should some form of appellate procedure exist, a reversed sanction won't
be perceived having been fair initially, especially if the punishment has
already been carried out. Concern about both the reality and perception
ofjustice became critical in the Army in the early twentieth century.
In 1917, black soldiers near Houston rioted against racial injustice;
fifteen white men died. Sixty-three black soldiers were tried at Ft Sam
Houston with the Staff Judge Advocate doing a daily review of the trial
transcript. Five were acquitted, 58 convicted, and the 13 sentenced to
death were executed the day after the trial without opportunity for review
by higher authority.35 Ultimately the trial and the internal Army legal
dispute that followed "caused a nationwide clamor for revision of the
1916 Articles of War.36
The then Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Enoch
Crowder also served as Provost Marshall General (and thereby Director
of Selective Service).37 Author of the 1916 Articles of War, General
Crowder was a traditionalist. The Acting Judge Advocate General of the
Army, serving in General Crowder's stead, was Brigadier General
34 Miller, supra note 32.
35 ARMY LAWYER: supra note 14, at 126. See also Fred L. Borch III, "The Largest Trial
in the History of the United States": The Houston Riots Courts-Martial of 1917,
Murder THE ARMY LAWYER, February 2011 at 1.
36 ARMY LAWYER: supra note 14, at 128.
3 Id. at 113. See generally Fred L. Borch, The Greatest Judge Advocate in History?
The Extraordinary Life ofMajor General Enoch H Crowder (1 85 9-1 93 2), THE ARMY
LAWYER, May, 2012, at 1.
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Samuel Ansell, a comparative liberal. General Ansell was appalled at the
executions and believed that the Judge Advocate General had statutory
authority to review convictions for serious error. The disagreement
between Generals Crowder and Ansell was extensive and highly public,
historically termed the "Ansell-Crowder debates.38 Ultimately, a general
order was published that permitted review in the Office of The Judge
Advocate General "in the nature of an appellate tribunal" before a death
sentence or dismissal could be carried out.39 "Civilianization" of military
law had begun. General Ansell's efforts to further civilianize military
criminal law and to rely more heavily on lawyers via the 1920 Articles of
War largely failedo - although the revised Articles prohibited reversing
an acquittal, required a judge advocate "law member" in general courts
and non-lawyer defense counsel in general and special courts-martial and
established a board of review as an appellate authority." Ultimately,
conflicts between the two generals and dissatisfaction with his public
advocacy for reform resulted in General Ansell's reduction to his
permanent grade of lieutenant colonel and his resignation.4 2 Perhaps
ironically, one of his staff, Major Edmund Morgan, later became a
Harvard Law School professor and the principal author of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
The World War II mobilization subjected large numbers of
Americans to the Army and Navy's military criminal legal systems. The
resulting dissatisfaction (and the spin-off of the Air Force from the Army
Air Corps) resulted in Congressional action. The first, interim measure,
was the Elston Act of 1948. For our purposes, the Elston Act is useful as
one small part illustrates and supports a key part of the thesis of this
article, that civilian procedure provides the role model for military
procedure.
Because it was unclear whether the Bill of Rights protects members
of the Armed Forces, 43 the Articles of War contained statutory
38 ARmY LAWYER supra note 14, at 128.
'9 Id. at 130 (but it is possible that a convening authority could disregard the
Judge Advocate General's decision. Id.).
40 Id. at 130.
41 Id. at 136-38.
42 Id. at 114-115.
43 A matter resolved by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Jacoby,
29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960) but as yet unaddressed by any Supreme Court
holding. See Frederic L. Borch & Fredric I. Lederer, Does the Fourth Amendment
Apply to the Armed Forces? 3 WM & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 219
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protections for rights such as the right against self-incrimination. Article
of War 24 protected that right, making it applicable to members of the
armed forces. It did not include, however, any requirement to warn a
service member of that right during interrogation, custodial or otherwise.
There was no warning requirement legally required in the United States
at that time, and none was required until the Supreme Court decided
Miranda v. Arizona in 1966." The FBI gave such a warning but only as
a matter of policy. Notwithstanding this, Article 24 was amended to
require such a warning after one member of Congress simply asserted
that such a warning was the civilian requirement:
Mr. Elston-"give the accused the same right a civilian
has who is charged in the civil courts, with a crime, of
being told that any statement he may make may be used
against him?
Mr. Burleson: That is right."4 5
When the Uniform Code of Military Justice subsequently was
enacted, the amended Article of War became U.C.M.J. Article 31(b), a
forerunner of the Miranda warnings. Military law had been modified on
the basis of assumed civilian procedure.
The Elston Act contained other military law provisions, especially
the creation of the Army's Judge Advocate General's Corps. Notably,
General Eisenhower testified against creation of the Corps.
In response to World War II complaints about military criminal law,
Congress created the Uniform Code of Military Justice.46 Enacted in
1950 and effective in 195 1, the Uniform Code of Military Justice
governed all of the armed forces. Perhaps its most important element was
the establishment of the three judge (now five judge) civilian Court of
Military Appeals. Feared by many military traditionalists as a potential
major source of possible civilianization, the Court, albeit lacking explicit
supervisory jurisdiction,4 ' did become a major player in military law via
(1994); reprinted in 144 MIL. L. REv. 110 (1994) and SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP.
December, 1994.
44 Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45 94 Cong. Rec. 185 (January 14, 1948).
46 See, e.g, Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1953).
47 ARmY LAWYER, supra note 14, at 200.
48 Whether and if so, to what extent, the court has supervisory power is controversial and
unclear. Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529,534-35 (1999) seems to hold that if the Court
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its case law, recognizing, for example, the application of the Bill of
Rights to service members 49 and incorporating Miranda into military law
and this requiring the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. 0
Although, the Court has to some extent "civilianized" military criminal
law, it has operated within the statutory framework of the U.C.M.J and
not threatened command control of the system." Notably, the Court has
condemned both the reality and appearance of unlawful command
influence, elevating due process over result-oriented discipline.
The new U.C.M.J. also contained Article 36, providing that the
President could for courts-martial prescribe rules "which shall, so far as
he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts. . . ." This led to the Military Rules of Evidence
largely based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Rules for Courts-
Martial, partially based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Against this backdrop of civilianization, in 1962 Congress amended
Article 15 to expand commander's summary hearing and punishment
power. 5 2 Major changes were made in the 1968 amendments to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, among which was the creation of the
position of military judge for general and special courts-martial, to be
filled by military lawyers certified by the Judge Advocate General of the
relevant service, provided the right to lawyer defense counsel at special
courts-martial (unless not possible, for example by reason of military
exigency), and renamed the Boards of Review as the Courts of Military
Review. 53 As the history of the Army JAG Corps puts it,
Thus, the Military Justice Act of 1968 was the
culmination of more than 15 years of debate among the
persons and agencies responsible for ensuring justice to
the American serviceman. It was the first change to the
concept of and structure for the administration of criminal
justice in the Armed Forces since 1951, and continued the
of Appeals for the Armed Forces has such power, it is strictly constrained. See generally
FRANCIS A. GLLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, II COURT-MARTIAL PROCEDURE 1§25-90.00
(4th ed. 2015).
49 United States v. Jacoby, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (C.M.A. 1960).
50 United States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967)).
51 Although it has safeguarded procedural decision making from unlawful
"command influence." See e.g., GLLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 9, at §8-16.00.
52 See, e.g., ARMY LAWYER supra note 14, at 236.
53 Id. at 245-47.
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theme of making that system as much like civilian courts
as possible.14
In 1983, Congress altered the post-trial responsibilities of convening
authorities from that of a quasi-judicial reviewer to that of an officer
empowered to adjudge clemency. Further, the Uniform Code was
amended to provide limited discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court."
Although the UCMJ provides that the convening authority
appoints both defense and trial counsel (prosecutors)-and the
military judge, actual practice differs. Pursuant to applicable
regulations, defense counsel are now part of defense organizations,
except in the Coast Guard, which uses counsel from other commands,
and judges are assigned by other judges. Only the trial counsel can be
appointed by an officer subject to the convening authority, in the Army
usually the staffjudge advocate.
In 1994, Congress renamed the Court of Military Appeals as the
United States Court of appeals for the Armed Forces and the Courts of
Military Review as the Courts of Criminal Appeals.
In 1999, Congress amended Article 19 of the Uniform Code to
increase the maximum sentence of special courts-martial from six
month's confinement to one year, making the general/special courts
roughly parallel to the civilian felony/misdemeanor structure. 5
In short, the modem history of military criminal law shows an
ongoing "civilianization," but one which largely retained command
control over much of the process. Although administrative discharges
substantially supplanted courts-martial as the preferred disposition of
UCMJ violators, courts-martial remained a defining element of military
criminal law. Indeed, as Colonel (Ret.) Fred Borch reports in his Judge
Advocates in Combat in Operation Desert Storm, "In the 1s Armored
Division, ... junior enlisted soldiers 'were surprised, if not shocked'
54 Id. at 245.
5 Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-209, 97 Stat. 1393, 1406. See also
U.C.MJ. art.67a.
56 Except that most U.C.M.J. offenses can be sent to either a general or special court-
martial. Article 19 of the U.C.M.J. prohibited only trial of capital cases. The National
Defense Authorization Act of 2014 amended article 18 of the U.C.M.J. to provide that
certain sexual assault cases may be tried only be general courts-martial. U.C.M.J. 18 (c).
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upon hearing that a trial by court-martial was being conducted the
night before the attack on Iraq."57
And, then came the modem era and the widespread recognition of the
need to better resolve the problem of sexual assault and harassment in the
Armed Forces
III. Combatting Sexual Assault and Harassment - The Amendment of
Article 60 and Afterwards
Recognition of the military's major problems with sexual assault and
harassment focused attention on the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In
addition to bolstering the protections afforded sexual assault victims, 58
the power and responsibility of commanders were criticized extensively.
One case served to crystalize the issues for many. Air Force Lieutenant
Colonel James Wilkerson, a fighter pilot, was accused of sexually
assaulting a female house guest. After a highly-contested trial, he was
convicted and sentenced to dismissal, one year's confinement, and
forfeitures.59 Pursuant to his powers under Article 60 of the UCMJ, the
convening authority, Lieutenant General Franklin, subsequently
disapproved the conviction and sentence, later stating that he simply did
not believe that the prosecution evidence was sufficient to convict a
reasonable doubt. Although appellate courts hold this power,o that a line
commander would reach such a conclusion, especially in the case of a
highly-favored accused, one who was considered a near certainty for
eventual promotion to general officer, was highly disturbing for many.
Ultimately Congress amended Article 60 to largely eliminate the
convening authority's post-trial powers. The revised Article 60 now
limits such powers to minor cases except as necessary to effectuate plea
bargaining.' Interestingly, there appear to be few if any cases in modem
history of a convening authority disapproving an entire verdict, and the
assumption of many was that the power would be used on the advice of a
57 FREDERICK BORCH, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT 190 (2001).
58 E.g., U.C.M.J. Art. 60(d) allowing victims to submit matters for consideration by
convening authorities.
5 See, e.g., Major Angela D. Swilley, A Whole Other Matter: The New Article 60(d) and
Handling Victim Submissions During Clemency, THE ARMY LAWYER, July, 2015 at 16,
17-18.
60 When they conclude that no reasonable fact finder could convict given the admissible
evidence.
61 See, e.g., Major Brent A. Goodwin, Congress Offends Eisenhower and Cicero by
Annihilating Article 60, UCMJ, ARMY LAWYER, July, 2014 at 23.
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staff judge advocate to cure major legal error. From a command
perspective, the power might be useful in the admittedly unlikely
circumstance of a commander needing the convicted accused for a
military mission of great importance. 62 On balance, the need to
disapprove a finding, as distinguished from an optional grant of sentence
clemency seems entirely unnecessary. Yet, the amendment of Article 60
further "civilianized" the military criminal legal system. It virtually
eliminated the convening authority's power to grant clemency based on
their intimate understanding of the nature of military life. Although the
need for such clemency might be minimal in the event of member
sentencing, assuming that the members had requisite experience, such
cannot be said of judge alone sentencing where few military lawyers
would have the knowledge and experience of combat arms personnel. It
was, however, not just the post-conviction powers of the convening
authority that came under legislative fire. The Article 32 Investigation
was converted to a Preliminary Hearing with a provision that victims
need not testify.
Dissatisfied with commanders having prosecutorial decision-making
power and responsibility, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand led an effort to
remove from convening authorities at least the power to refer sexual
assault cases, arguing that such power should be vested in Judge
Advocates. 63  As of the time this article was written, this legislative
reform effort has failed, although there now are UCMJ provisions that for
sexual assault cases provide for prosecutorial decision making at higher
levels, 6' and we can expect that most commanders will now rely heavily
upon the advice of their legal advisors which, of course, may not be any
better than a commander's judgment. We can expect similar efforts to be
made in the future. If successful, they will remove at least referral
power for sexual assault cases from the convening authority-and
perhaps more. At the extreme, prosecution of such cases could be
moved to
62 Id. at 24 quoting Eisenhower's position as transmitted during the 1949 House hearing
on the U.C.M.J.
63 Id. at 25. The goal, of course, is the increase the number of sexual assault prosecutions,
assuming that lawyers will be free of bias presumably held by commanders. Even
assuming that such a distinction exists, which is questionable, such a change could result
in less prosecution as prosecutors choose not to charge questionable cases or more cases
in an effort to assure good annual efficiency/fitness reports. Prosecutorial power is broad
enough that via allegations of other offenses, especially under the general articles, Articles
133 and 134, pretrial agreements likely could be obtained for at least other offense.
64 See The Carl Levin and Howard P. 'Buck' McKeon National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2015. See generally GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 9, at §8-14.30.
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civilian courts. Notably, the stage is set for a change which would make
the military criminal legal system mirror civilian prosecutions.
IV. Other changes
Meanwhile there have been other major changes in military law that
call into question the traditional assertions for a special military criminal
legal system. Despite general agreement that speedy trials are
particularly important in the armed forces so as to ensure the ability to
deploy and reassign personnel (and to ensure availability of witnesses),
the traditional emphasis on speedy trial no longer exists.
Article 10 of the UCM requires that:
Any person subject to this chapter charged with an offense
under this chapter shall be ordered into arrest or
confinement, as circumstances may require; but when
charged only with an offense normally tried by a summary
court-martial, he shall not ordinarily be placed in
confinement. When any person subject to this chapter is
placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate
steps shall be taken to inform him of the specific wrong
of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss the
charges and release him.
For a significant period, the then Court of Military Appeals required
that under United States v. Burton," that dismissal of charges was
required if the accused was in confinement in excess of ninety days, after
subtracting defense delays. Ultimately, as of 1991 the Rule 707(a) set
forth a 120-day rule, filled with escape holes, and Burton was no longer
applied.
Faced with lengthy delay in approving convictions and appeals, the
Court of Military Appeals in Dunlap v. Convening Authority6 6 required
dismissal of charges based on the extensive appellate delay involved and
created a ninety-day rule giving rise to a presumption of unacceptable
65 44 C.M.R. 166 (C.M.A. 1971), overruled by United States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258,
261 (C.M.A. 1993).
66 48 C.M.R. 751 (C.M.A. 1974).
530 [Vol. 225
2017] Civilianization of the Military Criminal Legal System
delay.17 The Court overruled Dunlap in United States v. Banks" in 1979,
however.
Recent data shows that for calendar years 2014 and 2015 the number
of days between preferral of charges to trial termination for Army
General Courts-Martial were 173.69 Insofar as special courts-martial are
concerned, the delay in 2014 was ninety-nine days; in 2015, eighty-five
days, and as of May 2, 2016, seventy-six.
Data is also available for the time between preferral of charges and
the first Article 39 (court session). For general courts-martial, that delay
was 109 days in 2014, 108 days in 2015, and 100 as of May 2, 2016. For
special courts-martial, the delay was seventy-three days in 2014, sixty-
eight days in 2015, and sixty-one days as of May 2, 2016.
Greater delay occurs after sentencing. Current data shows that in
2015, average time from sentencing to action was 203 days.70 In the
appellate area, in 2015 the average time from receipt to ACCA decision
was 298 days; of 537 decisions, 474 were rendered within 18 months.
For the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the most recent data
shows ninety-four days from petition filing to grant; 129 days from grant
to argument and 115 days from argument to final decision for Total
CAAF time of 338 days.
67 Id. at 754:
30 days after the date of this opinion, a presumption of a denial of
speedy disposition of the case will arise when the accused is
continuously under restraint after trial and the convening authority
does not promulgate his formal and final action within 90 days of the
date of such restraint after completion of trial.
68 United States v. Banks, 7 M.J. 92, 94 (C.M.A. 1979) (instead requiring proof of
prejudice). See generally 2 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-
MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 24-80.00 (4th ed. 2015).
69 Email from Homan Barzmehri, Management & Program Analyst, Army Court of
Criminal Appeals on behalf of Mac Squires, Clerk of Court of the Army Court of
Criminal Appeals (available through Professor Lederer). As of May 2, 2016. The 2016
delay was 171 days.
70 See the ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERALS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1968 To DECEMBER 31, 1968 at 23-24, http://
www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/annual/1968AnnualReport.pdf.
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Especially given the post-trial delay figures, it is hard to argue that
military necessity justifies a special military legal system
At the same time that delay has become endemic, the number of cases
has dropped sharply. In 1968, using the year of my commission, as a
simple baseline, there were a total of 57,685 general and special courts-
martial in the Army, 3.82 percent of a strength of 1,510,064 strength.
Those cases were handed by 1,490 active duty judge advocates, an
average of thirty-one general and special courts-martial per judge
advocate. In 2015, the Army had a total of 1,010 cases, .2 percent of a
strength of 491,363 with 1,819 active duty judge advocates for an
average of .47 percent general and special courts-martial per judge
advocate. There are similar data for the other services. One of the
reasons for the sharp decrease in cases is known to all-the armed
forces now administratively discharge many of those who in earlier
days would have been tried. It is unclear as to whether this is due to
enlightened justice and management or to the increasingly civilian
bureaucracy we have evolved, complete with delays.
V. The Military Justice Acts of 2016
The interservice Military Review Group headed by retired Chief
Judge Effron of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces drafted a
n This number is misleading as in those days, non-lawyers could try special courts-
martial. UCMJ art. 27 (c) (1951). The right to counsel came in the Military Justice Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335. This gave rise to "AWOL mills" in which special
commands were created for the express purpose of holding and trying (and/or
administrative discharging) minor offenders, especially those absent without leave.
Those offices had some lawyers but often had non-lawyers as well. By the time I
graduated from law school, including the summer before I began, I tried about 300 courts-
martial. In correspondence with me, Colonel Borch has opined that the absence of military
judges at that time was also a significant reason for the period's faster and more numerous
trials. It's certainly true that the absence of a legally trained judge discouraged motion
practice. It is clear that we used to try many cases which today have been diverted from
the criminal justice system. Overall, the change from a fast and efficient disposition
process with fewer due process protections to the present due process system illustrates the
on-going shift in military criminal law from discipline to justice.
72 See the ANNUAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND TO THE
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR
FORCE PURSUANT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER
1, 2014 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 at 48-49, http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/newcaaf/
annual/FYi 5AnnualReport.pdf.
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proposed Military Justice Act of 2016, hereinafter the "Proposed Act." 73
The Review Group's product encapsulated the drive to civilianize the
military criminal legal system. Congress chose not to enact the Proposed
Act. Instead, the actual Military Justice Act of 2016 (the "Enacted Act"),
enacted as part of the fiscal year 2017 National Appropriations Act,74
made far less sweeping changes.
A brief examination of the Proposed Act illustrates its scope and
inherent philosophic perspective. The Report that that summarized the
review group's findings stated that:
This Report examines many of the distinctions that
remain between military practice under the UCMJ and
federal and state civilian practice. The proposals
recommend aligning certain procedures with federal
civilian practice in instances where they will enhance
fairness and efficiency and where the rationale for
military-specific practices has dissipated.
The Report recommended the creation of special courts-martial
without members with sentences restricted to six month's confinement, a
recommendation adopted by Congress in the Enacted Act.7 6 Critically,
the Proposed Act would have placed enlisted personnel on courts-
martial panels for trial of enlisted personnel subject to objection by the
accused;7 7 eliminated member sentencing for all non-capital cases,
placed sentencing authority in the hands of the military judge, and
eliminated
73 REVmw GROUP REPORT, supra note 1.
74 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 §5001 et seq (December 23,
2016) [hereinafter NDAA 2017].
7 REVmw GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. The Report added:
This Report's proposals recommend retaining military-specific
practices where the comparable civilian practice would be
incompatible with the military's purpose, function, and mission, or
would not further the goals of justice, discipline, and efficiency in the
military context. Maintaining distinct military practices and
procedures-where appropriate-remains vital to ensuring justice
within a hierarchical military organization that must operate
effectively both at home and abroad, during times of conflict and times
of peace. Id. As will be seen below, I think that some of the proposed
changes would not have complied with this intent.
76 NDAA 2017, at § 5163.
7 See also NDAA 2017, at §5182.
533
MILITARY LAW REVIEW
automatic appeals. It would have also increased the military judge's
power to act before referral. The "civilianization" impact of these
proposed changes, had they all been enacted, is clear.
Although military justice has been increasingly divorced from the
average member of the armed forces in recent years, member sentencing
has survived as a relatively rare but important exception. From the
perspective of the accused, member sentencing means sentencing by
persons who have likely experienced the realities of military life,
especially the impact of deployments and combat duty. But in a time in
which most service members have little knowledge of what happens to
an accused, especially given the lengthy delays in the process, the
members are likely are also a valuable information conduit. Instead the
military judge, a judge advocate, likely to have never served in a
combat unit let alone have been in combat personally," would
have full sentencing responsibility. In the Enacted Act, Congress
rejected the total elimination of member sentencing. Instead, it created
fixed sizes for is no unrescourts-martial panels and permitted an
accused tried by members to elect sentencing by members.79
Both the Proposed and Enacted Acts increase the ability of the
prosecution to file interlocutory appeals,"o and sentencing appeals are
now possible." Both changes likely increase the time to try a case to
finality.
In accordance with the Proposed Act, the Enacted Act largely
removes the requirement for convening authorities to take "action" on a
court-martial finding. Instead, non-summary court-martial sentences
other than death or punitive discharges are self-executing.82 Sentencing
by Military Judge will now follow civilian procedure with each
78 Many judge advocates served in non-legal positions before going to law school
as members of the Funded Legal Education Program or, more rarely, an Excess Leave
Program. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ARmY REG. 27-1, JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL
SERVICES ch. 10. Overall, however, there is no reason to believe that military judges
necessarily would have had substantial backgrounds. Of course, this criticism can be
met with the reasonable counter argument that there is no requirement that members
with such backgrounds be appointed even though Article 25 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice requires appointment of "best qualified" members.
7 NDAA 2017, at §5183.
80 Id. at §5326.
8 Id. at §5330.
82 Id. at §5324; 5325.
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specification (offense) receiving a separate sentence with the judge's
decision to run consecutively or concurrently.
Interestingly, neither the Proposed nor Enacted Act removed
commanders from serving as convening authorities, the power and
responsibility to create (convene) courts-martial, refer cases to them, or
to select court-members.83 Although both the Proposed and Enacted Acts
create a form of fixed assignment term for military judges, neither created
an independent judiciary and both ignored the risk of post judicial-term
retribution." And, neither the review committee nor Congress seems to
have even contemplated statutorily enacting limits on military
jurisdiction over peacetime offenses in the form of the
overruled O 'Callahan v. Parker"-or following the United Kingdom
model of further civilianizing the military criminal justice process."
In short, military law continues the civilianization process but
apparently more slowly than some would prefer.
VI. Where are we going? Where might we want to go?
The Military Review Group opined in its report that:
The need to promote discipline through an instrument of
justice requires a court-martial system that differs in
important respects from civilian criminal justice systems.
As the Supreme Court has stated, the military remains a
specialized society separate from civilian society ...
83 The Military Justice Review Group chose not to address this issue in light of the recent
review of the Response Systems Panel. See REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at note
34.
84 See generally Fredric Lederer & Barbara Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military
Judiciary: A Proposal ToAmendthe Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice, 3 Wm. & M. Bill.
Rts. J. L. Rev. 629 (1994).
8 O'Callahanv. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (prohibiting military jurisdiction over "non-
service-connected" offenses in the United States during peacetime), overruledby Solorio
v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987); see generally GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 9,
at §2-32.
86 Prosecutorial decision-making in the U.K. is controlled by a civilian head, the Service
Prosecuting Authority. Service Prosecuting Authority, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
http://spa.independent.gov.uk/index.htm (last visited January 29, 2017). All
courts-martial judges in the UK are civilians. See, e.g., Military, COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/
jurisdictions/military-jurisdiction/ (last visited January 29, 2017).
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[because] it is the primary business of armies and navies
to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion
arise." This separateness of purpose and mission has
shaped the values and traditions that are embodied in the
UCMJ.... 87
I know of no scientific way to determine the degree to which a court
system delivers justice, as distinguished from efficiency. It is my
impression, and I think that of many others, that the military criminal
legal system viewed as a whole has done extremely well in its delivery
of justice, at least once a case makes it to trial." And, in all fairness
military justice should be compared to its highly flawed civilian
counterpart, which is hardly an enviable model. 89 Yet, if justice is the
goal, the current structure of the military criminal legal system clearly
needs further major change. At least at the general court-martial level,
which deals with our most serious offenses, there is no contemporary
justification in placing prosecutorial decision-making power and even
more so juror selection power in commanders. It is not unreasonable
for commanders intimately familiar with military life to make
prosecutorial recommendations, and, in some compelling cases,
decisions. Ordinarily, however, that value is heavily outweighed by
concerns about untrained and potentially biased decision-making by
non-legally trained officers whose primary goals are mission readiness
and victory. Once a case reaches a general court, there should be no
reason to believe that anything other than justice is appropriate. That
does not negate the potential value in permitting commanders in
exceptional circumstances to refer cases to trial or to discontinue a case
for sound military reasons. 90 This conclusion might suggest to some that
major cases might better be tried by civilian, perhaps Article III federal
courts. But, to do so-even if the Article III courts could handle the
caseload expansion-would remove the military knowledge necessary
for fundamental fairness. Military judges and other
87 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
88 Concerns about sexual assault and related cases are well known, especially insofar as
pretrial decision-making is concerned.
89 Notably, the accused appearing before special and general courts-martial not only
have free counsel, they have competent counsel, and the military appellate courts have
been especially active to ensure competency. See GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 9,
at §5-55.00 (4th ed. 2015).
90 The 2016 mistaken attack on a Doctors Without Borders Afghan medical center might
be such a case. But see Eugene Fidell, The Wrong Way to Handle the Kundez Tragedy,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/opinion/the-wrong-way-to
-handle-the-kunduz-tragedy.html?_r-0.
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judge advocates 9 1 may not all have combat experience but they are indeed
part of military life and culture and that knowledge is utterly essential.
If justice is the goal, what should be the role of commanders for it is
both discipline and justice that we need. It is my view that the current
military criminal legal system is increasingly failing in its discipline
function. We have obviated the argument that for military reasons we
must have speedy trials and appeals and eliminated the general deterrent
effect of rapid punishment known to our personnel. Our trial rate has
plummeted, but largely because of the use of administrative discharges.
At present, although the economy is growing, civilian work is frequently
competitive for many of our personnel. Should the economy boom,
removing the economic discouragement, will commanders have
reasonable and useful disciplinary punishment options?
We should adopt a two-tier system-a largely civilianized court-
martial system and a rapid limited due-process disciplinary system for
minor offenses. Non-judicial punishment under Article 15, "mast
punishment" in the Navy and Coast Guard, was intended as a fairly
minor, attention-getting informal sanction. Unfortunately, its authors
likely never took into account the military personnel managers
using Article 15 as a personnel management-and elimination-
tool. Commanders frequently won't use Article 15 not only
because that process is itself increasingly legalistic and
complicated, but also has unduly harsh career results. When I was an
Army War College student, a survey that I conducted, concededly
now quite dated, showed large numbers of commanders avoiding
Article 15 in favor of other, quasi legal, informal procedures.92
91 Although it must be conceded that most judge advocates try so few contested cases
that the criminal law and trial expertise that military counsel had is increasingly absent.
92 1992-93 C&GSC class former company commanders' responses to non-judicial
punishment alternatives. See 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-
MARTIAL PROCEDURE § 8-21.20 ( 4TH ED. 2015). The question was the degree to which
commanders used either extra-military instruction or other, unofficial means, to punish
persons otherwise subject to Article 15. My confirmed assumption was that many
commanders would do so either to avoid the effort involved in Article 15 or to avoid
adverse administrative consequences to the service member. See table 1 for a summary
of alternative punishment usage.
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lable 1. Use or non-Jucticial punishment alternatives
If we are to provide commanders the disciplinary power they need, I
believe that we should increase Article 15 punishments and remove most
procedural protections in return for elimination of their use for
administrative personnel management. The United Kingdom system
provides for detention for 28 days with an extension to 90 days if
approved by higher authority. 93 1 would also recommend the actual and
public use of Article 15 for at least junior officers in order to eliminate
the belief by enlisted personnel that officers receive no punishment for
offenses commonly punished if committed by enlisted personnel. 9 4 At
the same time, in addition to permitting a service member to demand trial
by court-martial as an alternative, we should restrict the use of Article 15
so that an individual can only receive NIP a limited number of times so
that it cannot be used as a subterfuge alternative to court-martial.
We would do well to recognize that the vast majority of
junior enlisted personnel-and officers-are young. Many serve in
positions in which we are training them for demanding combat duty.
Logically, those people are far more likely to commit minor offenses
than older personnel or those working in more peaceful pursuits. The
soldier trained to and prepared to use violence against the enemy is
going to take some time to fully internalize applicable societal limits,
especially in garrison. If we are both to ensure discipline and at the
same time not over-punish those who go in harm's way, we need a way
to firmly get their "attention" but not penalize them for the rest of
what might otherwise be a very short
93 Military Jurisdiction, COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://wwwjudiciary.
gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/jurisdictions/ military-jurisdiction/ (last
visited May 22, 2017).
94 Generally, power to use Article 15 against officers is restricted to highly senior
commanders. Officer "punishments" often take the form of bad efficiency or fitness
reports, consequences, even when career-ending, that are invisible to enlisted personnel
who then believer there are two separate justice standards.
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service career. 95 Interestingly, Congress, following the Proposed Act
made clear in the Enacted Act that summary courts-martial are not
"criminal convictions." 96 This increases the possibility for use of
summary courts without civilian collateral consequence, but does not
address the military administrative sanction.
VII. In Conclusion
Rome, whether the Republic or the Empire, is long gone. The history
of its legions suggest that they were not much concerned about justice,
and we can be certain that Americans would reject unmerited punishment
for the sake of military discipline. But, the Romans certainly understood
discipline, as did General Washington and many of our founders.
American military law has evolved and will continue to evolve. It is
legalized to an extent that is unprecedented. One that accords with our
Bill of Rights and the expectations of our citizens. We have worked hard
to achieve just proceedings and largely have succeeded in doing so.
But our model in the pursuit of justice has been our civilian legal
system, based on a desire and expectation for due process. That
system's goals and requirements have nothing to do with marshalling,
deploying, and fighting an effective armed force. We can and must do
better.
1 To say nothing of saving the cost of expensive recruiting and training of replacement.
The reader might reasonably ask, "Why not simply change personnel regulations to
eliminate use of Article 15's for promotion and retention decisions?" As I learned to my
disbelief when I was on active duty in the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the
Army, it is sometimes easier to amend the UCMJ than to change personnel regulations,
especially if we're in a time of reduction in force.
96 NDAA 2017, at § 5164.
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